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ABSTRACT 
	  
This thesis seeks to understand the relationship between county level economic 
voting and county level economic voting by demographic group on county level vote 
shares for U.S. presidential elections. Using an entity and time fixed effects regression 
model, I study the effects that county level growth in real per capita personal income and 
unemployment rate change have on county level two-party vote share for the Democratic 
Party. Additionally, I observe the responsiveness of a county’s voting behavior due to the 
demographic makeup of that specific county. I then compare my initial results to those of 
Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) for the 1992-2000 presidential elections. I utilize the 
same models for the 2004-2012 elections to compare these results to those from the 1992-
2000 elections. Additionally, I rerun my model for the 1992-2000 presidential elections, 
after restricting my economic data to non-outliers, to study the effects that outliers in 
economic conditions have on my original results. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“The economy, stupid.” Looking back on the words of Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist, 
James Carville, it seems as if truer words have never been spoken (Matalin, Mary, and 
James Carville, 461). US presidents know that the state of the economy will have a 
significant impact on their reelection chances, regardless of whether or not they actually 
have control over economic events. Economic research on presidential elections 
(including work by such individuals as Gerald Kramer, Ray Fair, Edward Tufte, and Nate 
Silver) have supported this notion by finding that voters see presidential elections as 
referenda on the incumbent party. If the incumbent party oversees a period of growth, it 
will be more likely to spend the next four years in the White House. On the other hand, if 
the incumbent party is in power during an economic downturn, voters will tend to favor 
an opposition candidate in the next election.  
 While it is well established in academic research that economics matters in 
presidential elections, little research, comparably, has been done on how local economic 
conditions affect presidential vote shares. This lacuna could be due to the lack of county-
level data readily available before the 21st century, and because of the fact that 
presidential elections, in the end, depend on Electoral College votes at the national level 
(which makes counties seem redundant in the face of the wider state).  
 Nevertheless, studying voting behavior at the county level does provide some 
noteworthy insights. Major media outlets have increasingly focused on grassroots 
campaigning in presidential. This makes county level data all the more valuable for 
campaign strategists who might wonder what affects the vote share of a given local 
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region. Additionally, with such a wide variety of economic and demographic 
characteristics across the 3,144 counties and county equivalents in the US, looking at 
county voting behavior provides a case study to see how well national level prediction 
models fit at the county level. Simply put, does the local economy even matter to voters 
at the county level? 
For the purpose of this thesis, I study county level economic voting and county 
level economic voting by demographic group using county and state-year fixed effects 
regression models. First, I review relevant literature covering economic voting models at 
the national and subnational (state and county) levels. Second, I explain my 
methodology, including my data sources, variable selection, and entity fixed effects 
regression model. Third, I compare my results to those of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) 
for the 1992-2000 elections. Then I run the same model for the 2004-2012 elections to 
see how the results of my model compare to the results of the 1992-2000 elections.1 
Finally, I run the model with 1992-2000 elections data after taking out outliers that make 
county level economic data run contrary to Okun’s Law.  
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The reason I choose to run the 2004-2012 elections is to compare the 1992-2000 results with another 
similar sample period. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic conditions affect American presidential elections; however, most of the 
research on these effects has focused on the national level. Subnational (state and county) 
level research is quite sparse, especially at the county level. While national level research 
is not a perfect parallel for the economic effects on voting at the subnational level 
because of the sheer number of counties (more than 3,000) and the differences in 
economic conditions among counties, it does provide a noteworthy background. It also 
raises the question of whether national effects of economic conditions on voting behavior 
hold true at a local level. Therefore, after addressing some of the seminal research in this 
field at the national level, I will look over the literature at the subnational level.  
 
2. 1.  NATIONAL MODELS 
The first seminal paper on the topic of how economics affects voting behavior in 
presidential elections was Kramer (1971). Kramer’s results demonstrated that, between 
1896 and 1964, there was a positive correlation between increases in real per capita 
personal income and the incumbent candidate’s party vote share. (Leighley, 2010; 375).  
Kramer’s (1971) model included growth of per capita personal income (both 
adjusted and not adjust for the cost-of-living index), unemployment, and inflation as 
economic independent variables. In his results, Kramer concluded that real per capita 
personal income was the most important of these variables. When per capita real personal 
income was held constant, changes in both the unemployment rate and inflation were not 
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statistically significant. Kramer’s findings that election vote shares are significantly 
affected by economic changes during the incumbent’s presidency strongly suggest that 
economic conditions matter in presidential elections (Kramer, 1971).  
Fair’s research on presidential elections has supported the findings of Kramer 
(1971). Fair has regularly updated his model for predicting presidential vote shares since 
Fair (1978), with his last major model adjustment occurring in Fair (1996) and latest 
iteration with updated data being published in Fair (2014). The main economic 
independent variables in Fair’s newest model include growth rate of real per capita GDP, 
inflation, and good news quarters. All of Fair’s economic variables are multiplied by a 
binary variable named DemIncumbent. This binary variable denotes whether or not the 
Democrats are the incumbent party for a certain election. The logic behind the inclusion 
of this variable is that voters will punish or reward the incumbent party for the economic 
performance of the nation during their term. Consequently, DemIncumbent equals 1 when 
the Democratic Party is the incumbent or -1 if the incumbent is the Republican Party.2 
Fair’s variables are irregular in their definition, so his results are not a perfect parallel to 
similar papers from other academics. Growth rate of real per capita GDP is represented in 
Fair’s model by the “growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first three quarters of the 
on-term election year (annual rate)” (Fair, 2014). The inflation variable is the “absolute 
value of the growth rate of the GDP deflator in the first 15 quarters of the administration 
(annual rate)” (Fair, 2014). The good news quarters variable is calculated by the “number 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This binary variable is inspired from the findings of Kramer (1971) regarding the referendum effect 
observed in presidential elections. 
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of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in which the growth rate of real 
per capita GDP is greater than 3.2 percent at an annual rate” (Fair, 2014). 
Table 2.1-1: Ray Fair 2014 Presidential Vote Share Model (Fair, 2014) 
Dependent Variable Coefficient (Change in 
Democrat Vote Share) 
t-stat 
Growth*DemIncumbent 0.676 7.37 
Inflation*DemIncumbent -0.717 -3.56 
GoodNews*DemIncumbent 0.958 5.03 
 
 As seen in Table 2.1-1, Fair finds that all three of his economic variables are 
statistically significant. An increase in either growth rate or good news quarters shows a 
positive effect on national vote share for the Democratic candidate when the Democratic 
Party is the incumbent, while an increase in inflation results in a decrease in the same 
vote share. Taken together, Fair’s results indicate that economics affects voting, which 
supports Kramer’s findings (1971).  
Alan Abramowitz created a presidential election prediction model that has 
successfully predicted the popular vote winner in every US presidential election since 
1988 within two percentage points or less. Abramowitz’s model, named “Time for 
Change,” originally only had three independent variables - the net approval rating of the 
incumbent president in June of the election year (NETAPP), change in growth rate of real 
GDP in the second quarter of the election year (Q2GDP), and the presence or absence of 
a first-term incumbent in the presidential race (TERM1INC) – to predict the major party 
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vote for the party of the incumbent president. Importantly, all three independent variables 
carry statistically significant coefficients. Model 1 describes both models (Abramowitz, 
2012). 
Abramowitz’s Time for Change Prediction Models3 
(Pre-2012) PV = 47.3 + (.107*NETAPP) + (.541*Q2GDP) + (4.4*TERM1INC) (2.1-1) 
(2012) PV = 46.9 + (.105*NETAPP) + (.635*Q2GDP) + (5.22*TERM1INC) – 
(2.76*POLARIZATION)        (2.1-2) 
 For the 2012 election, Abramowitz added a fourth independent variable, 
polarization, to reflect what he saw as an increase in the polarization of the US political 
landscape. Looking back at the elections since 1996, Abramowitz noticed a trend in 
recent elections towards smaller victory margins and lower inter-election vote swings 
when compared with earlier elections in the 20th century. As seen in model 2.1-2, the 
addition of the statistically significant polarization variable decreases the advantage of a 
first term incumbency by a little less than half (Abramowitz, 2012). When comparing the 
predictions of the adjusted model to the previous one in elections from 1996 onwards, 
Abramowitz found that the adjusted model improved the accuracy of the prediction by 
reducing the forecasted winning margin by half (Ripton, 2012). This result indicates that 
the electorate in recent elections has, in fact, become more polarized.  
 The adjusted model also shows a greater emphasis on the impact of the change in 
second-quarter GDP. Specifically, the coefficient grows by almost .1 percentage points, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As of the writing of this thesis, Abramowitz has not published accompanying regression data (standard 
errors, R-squared, SER, etc.) for his latest Time for Change Prediction models. 
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while staying statistically significant. As seen below in Table 2.1-2, the percentage 
change in second quarter real GDP has a noteworthy impact on the predicted popular vote 
(Abramowitz, 2012). This supports the national-level academic literature outlined above, 
which contends that economics has a statistically significant effect on voting behavior.  
Table 2.1-2: Conditional forecast of Obama’s share of the major party vote 
(Abramowitz) 
% Change in 2nd Quarter Real GDP Predicted Obama Popular Vote (%) 
-3 47.7 
-2 48.3 
-1 48.9 
0 49.6 
+1 50.2 
+2 50.8 
+3 51.5 
 
There has been some notable research into other variables that might influence 
voting, such as the demographic makeup of the electorate, which is helpful to correct for 
any omitted-variable bias that may be present when studying economic conditions and 
voting at the county level. While demographics of at the national level might change only 
gradually, demographic makeup across counties can vary wildly. For example, as seen in 
my summary statistics in Appendix Figure A and B, the percentage of black non-
Hispanics as part of the total county population can vary from 0% to 86.6%. This means 
that, at the county level, demographic makeup could potentially matter in the outcome of 
the county level vote share for a given presidential candidate. Since most of the research 
on voting across demographic groups has been done at the national level, it is useful to be 
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aware of potential demographic-specific voting preferences when one studies economic 
voting at the county level.  
The belief that different groups respond heterogeneously to economic conditions 
is well established. As Leighley (386) notes “group evaluations are either or both more 
personally relevant than national evaluations and more politically relevant than personal 
circumstance” (Leighley, 2010; 386). Seltzer and Hutto (2013) supported this idea, 
finding a racial difference in the perception of how the U.S. national economy was doing 
depending on who was the president at that time. Specifically, they observed a racial 
difference before the 2008 election, where whites were more likely than blacks to say that 
the national economy was doing, which switched once Obama was elected (Seltzer and 
Hutto, 2013).    
Hibbs et. al. (1982) studied how certain groups heterogeneously evaluate the 
economic performance of a president. When investigating how different occupation/labor 
force groups judge presidential economic performance, they find that blue-collar workers 
“exhibit relatively greater sensitivity to sustained movements in unemployment and real 
income growth and relatively less sensitivity to the inflation rate than white-collar 
workers or retirees” (Hibbs et. al., 1982). These results link up with their findings that the 
support of Democratic presidents is more sensitive to changes in unemployment and real 
income, as blue-collar workers typically vote for the Democratic Party. Similarly, the 
support of Republican presidents is more sensitive to changes in inflation, which is 
consistent with the fact that a noteworthy amount of their support base made up of white-
collar workers and retirees. Hibbs states that these evaluations and subsequent party 
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alignments “are not simply formations of voters united by psychological affinities long 
removed from concrete events; rather, they also may be realistically viewed as cleavage 
formations reflecting diverging objective interests over major political and economic 
issues” (Hibbs et. al., 1982).  
Ansolabehere et. al. (2014) also observed evidence that groups evaluate the 
economy heterogeneously. They discover that “individuals from groups that experience 
more unemployment report the national unemployment rate is higher” (Ansolabehere et. 
al., 2014; 381). Breaking this finding down into more specific groups, they note that 
ethnic minorities with lower educational attainment and individuals from states with 
higher unemployment rates perceive that there is a higher rate of national unemployment 
(Ansolabehere et. al., 2014; 381). 
The national level literature reviewed above is by no means an exhaustive list of 
research on the topic of voting for presidential elections in the U.S. Nate Silver’s book, 
The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – But Some Don’t, is one 
notable piece of literature that has been making headlines due to the accuracy of Silver’s 
prediction model for recent presidential elections (he accurately predicted the outcome of 
every state plus the District of Columbia in the 2012 election) (Branwen, 2012). 
Popularity functions are another noteworthy area of research, which study the economic 
effects on the approval rating of the current president. 
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2.2 SUBNATIONAL MODELS 
The research on the economic effects on voting behavior at the subnational level, by 
comparison to the national level, is sparse. The question of this research is, essentially: do 
subnational level economic conditions have an effect on presidential election voting 
behavior? At the county level this question is especially intriguing as one can study the 
economic effects on voting in over 3,000 counties, each with its own economic and 
electoral story. Additionally, as is always the case with statistical research, more 
observations will give more accurate results, all other things being equal. Unfortunately, 
the amount of research done at the county level is quite limited; therefore, it is helpful to 
also review those papers that study the economic effects on voting at the state level as 
their models can be adapted to the county level.   
Blackley and Shepard (1994) studied state-level economic effects on state 
presidential vote shares. They used a weighted least squares (WLS) model to predict the 
state vote shares in the 1992 election between George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The 
state level economic variables in their model included the state level unemployment rate 
in September 1992 and state level growth rate in real per capita personal income for the 
one year period ending in the second quarter of 1992. The other variables incorporated in 
their model are: Bush’s vote share in the 1988 election, change in voting population, 
binary variables for the home states of the president and vice president, and a further 
three binary variables for regions in the US. In their results, Blackley and Shepard found 
that the variables for state-level unemployment rates and per capita income have a 
statistically significant effect on the three-party vote share. As seen in Table 2.2-1, an 
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increase in the unemployment rate increased the vote share for the Democratic Party 
candidate, Bill Clinton, by 1.1 percentage points. Additionally, an increase in the growth 
of real per capita personal income decreased the same vote share by .9 percentage points 
(Blackley and Shepard, 1994). 
Table 2.2-1: Vote-share coefficients for the 1992 Election – Blackley and Shephard 
(2004) 
Independent Variable Clinton Vote-Share (WLS) 
Unemployment Rate (92) 1.126** (0.288) 
Income (91-92) -0.872* (0.432) 
**(*) coefficient is significantly different from the null value at the 0.1 (0.5) level for a one-tailed test 
Table 2.2-2: Vote-share coefficients for the 1992 Election – Abrams and Buskewitz 
(1995) 
 Independent Variable Bush’s Vote-Share (OLS) Bush’s Vote-Share 
Model A Unemployment Rate (92) -0.76 (3.2) -0.72 (5.1) 
Income (91-92) -0.02 (0.2) 0.80 (5.7) 
Model B Unemployment Rate (92) -0.62 (2.8) -0.33 (1.5) 
Income (91-92) 0.23 (2.7) 0.50 (8.8) 
 t-statistics in parentheses 
Abrams and Butkiewicz (1995) supported the findings of Blackley and Shephard 
(1994) as they found that economic conditions at the state level have a statistically 
significant effect on voting. Abrams and Butkiewicz also studied the 1992 election; 
however, there are some noteworthy differences in their methodology when compared to 
Blackley and Shephard (1994). While their model included state-level unemployment 
rates in September 1992, Abrams and Butkiewicz incorporated change in real per capita 
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personal income growth over the four-year period ending in the second quarter of 1992 
and the one-year period used by Blackley and Shephard. Abrams and Butkiewicz’s other 
independent variables include the previous vote share of Bush in 1988, the vote share of 
third-party candidate Ross Perot, a binary variable for Arkansas, and unexpected growth 
in the state’s real per capita income. Additionally, Abrams and Butkiewicz used two 
models, OLS and WLS, to find the effects of their independent variables on the three-
party vote share in an effort to compare the results of each model. As seen in Table 2.2-2, 
they found that both the change in unemployment rate and real per capita income have 
statistically significant effects on Bush’s vote share (Abrams and Butkiewicz, 1995). The 
coefficient signs for their WLS results are the same as Blackley and Shephard’s, which 
supports the conclusion that an increase in unemployment rate will increase the vote 
share for a Democratic candidate while an increase in growth of real per capita personal 
income will decrease that same vote share.  
Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), the paper on which this thesis is based, compared 
the effects of economic conditions - between the county, state, and national levels - on 
vote shares at the county level. When contrasting the effects of economic conditions at 
the county level with those at the state and national levels, they found that the county-
level conditions, while significant, have the weakest effect on voting behavior of the 
three (Leighley, 2010; 388). While their main focus was on comparing these levels, 
Eisenberg and Ketcham also studied economic voting solely at the county level. Their 
two models, for economic voting and economic voting by demographic group, are seen 
below. 
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County Level Economic Voting with State*Year Fixed effects (Eisenberg and 
Ketcham, 2004; 4) 
Demrt  = α + β1grtIt + δIt+ φCr+  γSrt+ εrt    (2.2-1) 
County Level Economic Voting by Demographic Group (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 
2004; 12) 
Demrt  = α + β1grtIt + β2 grtIt Drt + δIt+ φCr+  γSrt+ εrt  (2.2-2) 
Demrt denotes the two-party presidential vote share for the Democratic Party. grt 
represents either the growth in per capita personal income or unemployment rate change. 
It denotes incumbency, 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat or -1 if the incumbent is a 
Republican. Drt represents a certain demographic group (for the purposes of this thesis, I 
will look at the results of their models with blacks and males). Cr and Srt are both vectors 
of dummy variables that control for county or state-year fixed effects. Specifically, the 
two variables estimate “economic voting from the observations in which voting or 
economic performance in a given county-year deviates from that which would be 
expected in that county on average and in that state-year on average” (Eisenberg and 
Ketcham, 2004; 4). 
In their first set of results, as seen in Table 2.2-3, Eisenberg and Ketcham found 
that, when looking at the past year, only unemployment rate change had a statistically 
significant effect at the 10% level on the vote share of the Democratic presidential 
candidate.  
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Table 2.2-3: County Level Economic Voting for Past Year (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 
2004; 9) 
VARIABLES Real Per Capita Income Growth 
(%) (1972-2000 Elections) 
Unemployment Rate Change 
(1992-2000 Elections) 
   
Incumbent 0.0887*** 
(0.0004) 
 
  
Econ * 
Incumbent 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
 
Observations 24,422 9,324 
R-squared 0.924 0.969 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In Eisenberg and Ketcham’s (2004) second set of results, as seen in Table 2.2-4, 
they found various variables to be statistically significant. For blacks over the past year, 
they found that counties “with higher proportions of black residents have greater changes 
in voting behavior as a result of county income,” (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004; 13) but 
not county unemployment. Furthermore, for males, they found there was no significant 
effect on voting from either income or unemployment over the past year (Eisenberg and 
Ketcham, 2004; 13). 
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Table 2.2-4: County Level Economic Voting by Demographic Group for Past Year 
(Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004; 14) 
 Black  Male 
VARIABLES Real Per 
Capita Income 
Growth (%) 
(1972-2000 
Elections) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
(1992-2000 
Elections) 
Real Per 
Capita Income 
Growth (%) 
(1972-2000 
Elections) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
(1992-2000 
Elections) 
     
Incumbent 0.0835***  0.0176***  
 (0.0010)  (0.0003)  
% Demographic 
Group 
0.7091*** 
(0.0468) 
0.3947*** 
(0.0535) 
-0.2373*** 
(0.0545) 
-0.1901*** 
(0.0405) 
Econ * 
Incumbent 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0013 
(0.0013) 
0.0014 
(0.0014) 
-0.0065 
(0.0088) 
 
Econ * 
Incumbent * % 
Demographic 
Group 
0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0022 
(0.0029) 
0.0157 
(0.0188) 
     
Observations 21,363 6,216 21,363 6,216 
R-squared 0.931 0.982 0.927 0.982 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Taken together, Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) found that only unemployment 
rate change over the last year has any statistically significant effect on presidential voting, 
unless one is looking at the responsiveness of blacks to their local county economy.  
Lacombe and Shaughnessy (2007) studied the results of the 2004 presidential 
election at the county level to see what affected the vote share for the Republican 
incumbent, George W. Bush. The used both an OLS and spatial error model (SEM) to see 
if spatial error correlation is present. Specifically, they wanted to see if certain 
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independent variables that are statistically significant under an OLS model might not be 
significant when the model is corrected for spatial autocorrelation (Lacombe and 
Shaughnessy, 2007). 
The independent variables used by Lacombe and Shaughnessy in both of their 
models included various demographic, political, and economic characteristics. The 
economic variables used included both log per-capita income and the unemployment rate 
at the county level. As seen in Table 2.2-5, their OLS results found that eleven 
demographic, political, and economic variables were statistically significant at the 1% 
level. When they adjusted to correct for spatial autocorrelation, they found that only eight 
variables were significant at the 1% level, with two being significant at the 5% level and 
one at the 10% level. While both log per-capita personal income and unemployment rate 
were statistically significant at the 1% level in the OLS model, log per-capita became less 
statistically significant (5% level) in the SEM (unemployment rate stayed at the 1% level) 
(Lacombe and Shaughnessy, 2007). 
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Table 7: OLS and SEM Results (Lacombe and Shaughnessy, 2007) 
 OLS SEM 
Independent 
Variables 
Popular Vote 
Percentage for 
Bush by County 
t-
statistics 
Popular Vote 
Percentage for 
Bush by County 
t-
statistics 
Constant 1.4827 8.86* 0.5823 5.27* 
% Black -0.0006 -1.47 -0.0022 -8.92* 
% White 0.0016 4.30* 0.0037 18.64* 
% Hispanic -0.0002 -0.57 -0.0002 -0.95 
% Urban 
Population 
-0.0025 -0.26 -0.0073 -1.26 
Female Population 
with Bachelor’s 
-1.1312 -10.13* -0.4436 -6.26* 
Male Population 
with Bachelor’s 
0.8016 7.09* 0.1262 1.88*** 
Gay Marriage 
Dummy 
0.0221 5.61* 0.0102 1.59 
% Veterans 0.2432 3.42* 0.2056 3.82* 
% Religious 
Adherents 
0.0150 1.07 0.0267 2.71* 
Churches per 
10,000 People 
0.0017 7.06 0.003 1.56 
Texas State 
Dummy 
0.1171 15.22* 0.0610 3.79* 
Massachusetts State 
Dummy 
-0.1690 -8.23* -0.0564 -2.20** 
Log Per-Capita 
Personal Income 
-0.0901 -5.34 -0.0235 -2.10** 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.0262 -18.13 -0.0096 -9.11* 
*Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 10% level. 
Lacombe and Shaughnessy’s SEM results contradicted the findings of Eisenberg 
and Ketcham (2004), as Lacombe and Shaughnessy showed that county-level data were 
applicable and appropriate when estimating national voting models. Furthermore, they 
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found that both unemployment and per-capita income over the past year, not just 
unemployment rate change, are statistically significant independent variables. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
For the purposes of thesis, I will use a county and state-year fixed effects regression 
model to determine the effects of county level economic conditions on county level 
presidential two-party vote share.  
 
3.1 BUILDING AN ENTITY AND TIME FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
When creating a model to study county level economic voting, we must keep in mind one 
crucial difference between data at the national and county level. Namely, counties have 
significantly different characteristics relative to a national average, which, by definition, 
is only a single number.  The data set used in this thesis contains 3,049 counties 
observations, and some of the variation in the data is extraordinarily large. For example, 
in 2010, Arthur County, NE, had a population of only 465 with a real per capita personal 
income of $25,164 and an unemployment rate of 4.6%, compared with over 9.8 million 
people living in Los Angeles County, CA with a real per capita personal income of 
$40,668 and an unemployment rate of 16.9%.  
Although, in general, we prefer more variation for statistical reasons (precision of 
estimators), the type of differences observed here have the potential to create a significant 
problem. Consider a consistently high (low) income county. It is likely that small 
percentage changes in income growth will be dominated by the level-income effect when 
it comes to party preferences. Alternatively, consider a county with a small labor 
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force/population. A single change in its economic environment, such as a single firm 
shutting down its business, could have a drastic effect on real per capita personal income 
or unemployment. For example, the smallest county population observed in the election 
years studied in this thesis numbered just 40 people (including any children under 18 who 
are ineligible to vote). This minuscule population size has a disproportional impact on 
how the counties react to changes in its economic characteristics. To use an example, a 
bus driving into this county and dropping off 20 new migrant workers would change the 
county’s real per capita personal income level and unemployment rate in a significant 
matter. Since OLS is sensitive to outliers, counties of this type can significantly impact 
results.  
 
3.2 FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODEL: COUNTY LEVEL 
ECONOMIC VOTING 
 
To correct for the some of the effects generated by outliers, I use a county (entity) fixed 
effects regression model. Stock and Watson (2015) describe fixed effect regression 
models as “a method for controlling for omitted variables in panel data when the omitted 
variables vary across entities … but do not change over time” (Stock and Watson, 2015; 
396). Fixed effects control for omitted variables such as party preference due to persistent 
economic conditions or irregular population characteristics that have a singular effect on 
presidential voting in a single county across different elections. 
Similar to the models used by Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), my regression 
specifications include both state-year and county entity fixed effects. 
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Demrt = β0 + β1incumbentt + β2(Econrt*incumbentt) + β3Srt+ Cr + εrt       (3.2-1) 
Demrt = β0 + β1incumbentt + β2Demogrt + β2(Econrt*incumbentt) + 
β4(Demogrt*Econrt*incumbentt) +  β5Srt+ Cr + εrt                  (3.2-2) 
 
The dependent variable Demrt denotes the two-party presidential election vote 
share of the Democratic Party for a specific county, r, in a certain election year, t. 
The variable incumbentt is an indicator of the party of the incumbent president for 
a given election year t. As is standard in the literature, incumbentt equals 1 if the 
incumbent is a Democrat and (-1) if the incumbent is a Republican in the election year. 
The inclusion of this variable is necessary because, as first suggested by Kramer (1971), 
voters see elections as referenda on the economic performance of the incumbent party. 
Therefore, incumbency is multiplied by the county level economic variables Econrt for 
that given county, r, and year, t, to extract the referendum effect.  
To study the legacy of the economic conditions at the county level for a given 
incumbent party, I multiply growth in real per capita personal income and unemployment 
rate change (separately) by the incumbent binary variable. Multiplying these variables 
will account for the referendum effect of presidential elections, where voters punish 
(reward) an incumbent party for their poor (good) economic legacy in the previous 
presidential term. For example, an increase in growth of real per capita personal income 
will contribute to the sense of a positive economic legacy for the incumbent party. 
Therefore, an increase in growth of real per capita personal income (gpci) during the term 
of a Democratic president will increase the vote share of the Democratic candidate in the 
next election as voters attribute the improvement in their county’s economic conditions to 
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said incumbent party. On the other hand, an increase in unemployment rate change 
(meaning, higher unemployment) will have a negative effect on the economic legacy of 
the incumbent party. Consequently, an increase in the change in the unemployment rate 
(cur) during the term of a Democratic president will decrease the vote share of a 
Democrat candidate in the next election as voters punish the Democratic Party for its 
poor economic legacy. This expectation assumes that economic conditions affect both 
Democrat and Republican incumbents symmetrically. Consequently, county and state-
year fixed effects are necessary as some counties might have a proclivity to vote for a 
certain party due to their specific economic conditions.  
Srt is a vector that includes binary variables for each state-year combination. For 
example, the state of Alabama for the election year of 1992 would become AL×1992. 
The variable Cr denotes a binary variable for each county (numbering 3,048 from the 
1992-2000 elections and 3,049 from the 2004-2012 elections), which controls for omitted 
variables that may vary across different counties but not within a county over time. The 
impact of the state-year and county binary variables is to control for the changes in voting 
behavior from those observations in which economic performance or voting deviates 
from what is usually expected in that county and state-year combination on average. 
Therefore, one can run a regression across counties that vary in any number of 
characteristics across different elections without having the results muddied by outliers 
due to persistent county or state-time characteristics.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Just to clarify, this means that my model is both an entity and time fixed effects model.  
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The variable Demogrt stands for a demographic mix variable for county r in 
election year t. It is interacted with the incumbent party-economic variable to determine 
whether or not counties with high or lower proportions of a specific demographic group 
are more or less responsive to changes in economic conditions. These results give 
evidence on the characteristics of economic voting for a specific demographic group. 
 
3.3 VARIABLE SELECTION 
For the purpose of this thesis, data are collected entirely at the county level. In many 
ways, this thesis attempts to check whether Eisenberg and Ketcham’s (2004) county level 
result can be used to explain county level voting behavior beyond their sample period. 
For the election years of 1992-2000, these data includes 3,048 of 3,143 counties/county 
equivalents in the United States. For the election years of 2004-2012, this data covers 
3,049 of 3,144 (“United States Census Bureau”, 2012) counties/county equivalents in the 
United States due to the establishment of Broomfield County, Colorado in 2001 (Miller, 
2012). 
Presidential vote share data is found from the online Congressional Quarterly 
Press’s Voting and Elections Collection. The two-party vote share only takes into account 
the total popular vote for the Democratic and Republican parties. Third parties are not 
included because they do not typically threaten the hegemony of the main two parties 
with just a few percentage points of the national popular vote in presidential elections. 
Using the two-party vote share is the standard approach of the literature on this topic.  
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 The change in the unemployment rate at the county level is one of the two main 
economic independent variables. Unemployment rate data at the county level from 1990 
to 2013 were downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website. Studying the 
1992-2000 elections, Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) found that interacting 
unemployment rate change with the incumbency variable in the past year had a 
statistically significant (at the 10% level) effect. Changes in the unemployment rate in the 
past two, three, or four years prior to the election had no statistically significant effects on 
voting (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004). 
 The growth rate of real per capita personal income at the county level is the 
second main independent economic variable. Per capita personal income by county data 
from 1969 to 2013 was downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website. Per 
capita personal income was adjusted for inflation by using the Federal Reserve of St. 
Louis (FRED) national GDP deflator. Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) found that 
economic voting based on real per capita personal income growth did not have a 
statistically significant effect on vote share. Changes in growth of real per capita personal 
income over the past two, three, and four years, however, all had a statistically significant 
effect in changing the two-party vote share at the 1% level (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 
2004). As seen in Graph 3.3-1, these results are consistent with Fair (1978), which 
tracked how an increase in real per capita personal income growth increases the two-
party vote share of the incumbent party. 
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Graph 3.3-1: Weighted Personal Income Growth vs. Share of Two-Party Vote (Re-
Election) 
Source: 
http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/.a/6a00d83451d25c69e2013483a24f07970c-popup 
Similarly to Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), I include a few demographic 
independent variables in my model. These include: percent of blacks (non-Hispanics) and 
females as part of the total county population. Demographic data for this thesis were 
downloaded from the Missouri Census Data Center for the years 1992-2011.5 
While Kramer (1971) established that economic variables had a significant effect 
on president elections, demographic variables are also important. Mutz and Mondak 
(1997) note that, “in studies of American political behavior it is axiomatic that groups 
matter” (Leighley, 2010; 386). These groups can be created from any set of criteria, from 
race to religion to special interests. As shown by Hibbs, et al. (1982), these groups view 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I address my adjustment to allow me to run regressions for the 2012 election in my Data Modifications 
section below. 
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elections heterogeneously. This means that each group will have a different preference 
for which party they choose to vote for.  
The three main racial/ethnic voting groups in the US over the time period covered 
by this thesis are: Blacks (Non-Hispanic), Hispanics, and Whites (Non-Hispanic). Non-
Hispanic blacks6 typically vote for the Democratic Party. Polls conducted by the New 
York Times have found that 82% or more of blacks at the national level have supported 
the Democratic presidential candidate since they began polling blacks as a specific group 
in 1972 (New York Times, 2008). At the county level, the results of these polls are 
maintained by the findings of Lacombe and Shaughnessy (2007). They observed that an 
increase in the percentage of blacks in the total county population resulted in a 
statistically significant decrease in the vote share for the Republican Party (Lacombe and 
Shaughnessy, 2007). Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) found that counties with a higher 
proportion of blacks are more responsive to changes in voting due to changes in real per 
capita personal income growth.  
Gender differences are another noteworthy voting determinant. The Rutgers’s 
Center for American Women and Politics has found that women, as an overall voting 
group, have historically (from 1984-2014) supported the Democratic Party presidential 
candidates by a larger proportion than men. In addition, women typically approve the 
performance of Democratic presidents more favorably than men and vice versa for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 To clarify, Hispanics are defined by the Census Bureau as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race” (US Census Bureau, 
2010). This means that non-Hispanics, of any race, are those individuals who are do not have a Hispanic et 
background. The benefit of using this more specific data is to focus specifically on blacks as a voting 
group, without those who might consider themselves Hispanic (a definition that can span across racial 
groups).  
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Republican presidents (Center for American Women and Politics, “The Gender Gap”, 
2014). Therefore, one would expect that a county with a higher proportion of women 
would see an increase in the vote share for the Democratic Party. This hypothesis is 
supported by Lacombe and Shaughnessy (2007), who find that an increase in the 
percentage of females with a bachelor’s degree will result in an increase in the 
Democratic Party vote share (Lacombe and Shaughnessy, 2007). Eisenberg and Ketcham 
(2004) did not include the share of females as a demographic group in their paper.  
The reason I choose to include females instead of males in my regression models 
is due to the importance of females as a voting group in presidential election. Since 1980, 
the Center for American Women and Politics found that females consistently vote at a 
higher rate and in greater numbers than males in presidential elections (Center for 
American Women and Politics, “Gender Differences in Voter Turnout”, 2014). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to focus on females instead of males as a voting group.  
It is worth noting that, when looking more in depth into the gender gap in voting, 
the Democratic voting tendencies of women is less clear-cut. Breaking down the “gender 
gap” into a “gender and marital status gap,” one finds that 46% of married women, 
compared to 67% of single women, voted for Obama in 20127 (MSNBC, 2012). Taking 
into account the fact that women typically live longer than men,8 the growing number of 
those 65 or over in the U.S.,910 and the fact that married women are more likely to vote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This gap is also seen in the voting tendencies of men, with 38% of married men compared with 67% of 
single men voting for Obama in 2012. (MSNBC, 2012) 
8 In 2011, there was a ratio of 131 women to 100 men for individuals 65 or over. 
9 The US Department of Health and Human Services predicts individuals over the age of 65 to make up 
21% of the population by 2040, compared to 13.3% in 2011 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2012). 
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Republican (only 4% of women over 65 in 2012 were never married), one could 
potentially see an increase in the percentage of women voting Republican in the future. 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). However, at the moment, this 
postulation is based on speculation. Since my data set does not include statistics for the 
marriage status nor age group of females at the county level, I will not address this caveat 
in my results.  
Polls are imperfect indicators for county level characteristics since all polls 
mentioned so far are conducted at the national level. It is also possible that there might be 
inconsistencies in the way that groups view political parties due to sampling bias. For 
example, while women may strongly support the Democratic Party at the national level, 
their voting tendencies might not be as strong in certain counties due to specific 
circumstances such as the local political culture or age. Second, the polls mentioned 
above do not take into account voter turnout. Some counties might see a greater 
proportion of supporters of one party voting for their candidate on Election Day while the 
other party supporters stay at home, regardless of what characteristics define the county. 
Taken together, all of the polls that support the hypotheses above should be taken as a 
rough indicator of what to expect, while not being conclusive proof of voting behavior. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Only 44% of individuals 65 or over voted for Obama in 2012 (MSNBC, 2012). 
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3.4 OTHER DATA MODIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The data set does include some noteworthy modifications. Alaska was eliminated from 
the set because its boroughs do not align with voting districts. The District of Columbia 
was also excluded because it does not have counties. Certain independent cities and 
counties in Virginia were also left out (the list of counties is found in Appendix Figure L) 
because the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ per capita income data combines independent 
cities that had a population of less than 100,000 in 1980 with a neighboring county. Since 
estimates for these individual cities/counties are not available, I decided to leave them out 
instead of scrapping the variable altogether. Thankfully, all of the exclusions mentioned 
above are of regions with relatively small populations; therefore, one would expect that 
their exclusion would not have a significant impact on the results from the other 3,049 
counties. Unfortunately, the demographic data from the Missouri Census Data Center - 
including percentage black, percentage female, and total population - only included 
observations until 2011. Consequently, I duplicated the 2011 data into 2012 as a rough 
estimate of county level demographic makeup for that year.  
   
3.5 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Summary statistics for the election years from 1992-2000 appear in Appendix Figure A, 
and those for the elections from 2004-2012 are found in Appendix Figure B. The 
Democratic Party two-vote share for the 1992-2000 presidential elections consists of 
9,147 observations with a mean of 46.7%. For the years 2004-2012 elections, there are 
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9,148 observations with a mean of 40.0%. The change in the unemployment rate for the 
1992-2000 elections has 9,345 observations with a mean of -0.05 percentage points, and, 
for the 2004-2012 elections, there are 9,325 observations with a mean of -0.08 percentage 
points. The growth in real per capita personal income for the 1992-2000 elections has 
9,345 observations with a mean of 4 percentage points, and for the 2004-2012 elections it 
has 9,325 observations with a mean of 3 percentage points. 
There are some noteworthy extraordinary outliers in the data for change in 
unemployment rate and growth in real per capita personal income. For the 1992-2000 
election years, the minimum change in unemployment rate was -13.9 percentage points 
and the maximum was 12.7 percentage points. For the 2004-2012 election years, the 
minimum change in unemployment rate was -4.3 percentage points and the maximum 
was 8.3 percentage points. In the 1992-2000 election years, the minimum growth in real 
per capita personal income was -85 percentage points and the maximum was 39 
percentage points. For the 2004-2012 election years, the minimum growth in real per 
capita personal income was -48 percentage points and the maximum was 54 percentage 
points. These figures indicate just how much diversity there is in county level data, which 
makes an entity and time fixed effects model all the more essential for my regression 
analysis.  
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4. RESULTS 
My results consist of three different parts. First, I replicate the models from Eisenberg 
and Ketcham (2004) for the 1992-2000 elections, with separate models for county level 
economic voting and county level economic voting by demographic group. Second, I use 
the same model for the 2004-2012 elections to test how the results compare with the 
1992-2000 elections. Third, I use Okun’s Law to identify outliers in the economic data. I 
then run a similar model to compare my results to the original 1992-2000 elections. 
 While one might argue that it is redundant to put emphasis on statistical 
significance at the county level, I want to stress that my model is not looking solely at the 
population of the county. Instead, I am studying the presidential elections in counties 
across time, which is why I have time fixed effects (in addition to entity fixed effects). 
Additionally, data collected at the county level is, by nature, imperfect (including my 
population data, which is estimated between decennial census years). This means that 
statistical significance is still relevant, as the data does not perfectly represent the 
county’s characteristics. 
  
4.1 1992-2000 ELECTIONS RESULTS 
I first run model 3.2-1 for the 1992-2000 presidential elections to compare my results to 
those of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004). 
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Table 4.1-1: County Level Economic Voting for the 1992-2000 Elections11 
VARIABLES Real Per Capita Income Growth (%) Unemployment Rate Change 
   
Incumbent 3.372***  
 (0.946)  
Econ * Incumbent -0.590 0.0224 
 (0.808) (0.0283) 
Constant 49.82*** 46.11*** 
 (0.458) (0.0494) 
   
Observations 9,147 9,147 
R2 0.810 0.810 
Number of Counties 3,048 3,048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As seen in Table 4.1-1, neither real per capita personal income growth nor 
unemployment rate change over the past year has a statistically significant effect on 
presidential voting. This finding deviates from the results of Eisenberg and Ketcham 
(2004), who found that unemployment rate change (over the past year) had a statistically 
significant effect on vote share at the 10% level. The Econ*Incumbent coefficients have 
the same signs as the results of Eisenberg and Ketcham (both positive). The Incumbent 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and positive, just like in Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004). It is also worth noting that Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) had higher 
regression R2 values in their results (.979 versus .81). These results indicate that, in the 
elections of 1992-2000, neither growth in real per capita personal income nor 
unemployment rate changes over the past year had a statistically significant effect on vote 
shares.  These data do not support the idea that the state of the county level economy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that the decimal places are different between the real per capita personal income growth and 
unemployment rate change data (see the Summary Statistics in Appendix Figures A and B). Additionally, I 
abbreviate real per capita personal income growth to real per capita income growth for the sake of space. 
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affects the county level presidential vote choice, at least not for the economic variables 
considered here.  
 I then run model 3.2-2 for county level economic voting by demographic group 
for the 1992-2000 elections. These results examine how responsive the county level vote 
share is due to the percentage of a certain demographic group as part of the total county 
population. 
Two notable differences between my models and Eisenberg and Ketcham’s are: I 
specify the demographic group “black” as black non-Hispanic, thereby removing black 
Hispanics, and I use the variable female instead of male. The reason I specify black non-
Hispanics is to focus specifically on the voting patterns of black voters, and not have the 
data affected by the voting patterns of those who identify as both black and Hispanic.  
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Table 4.1-2: County Level Economic Voting by Demographic Group for the 1992-
2000 Elections 
 
 Black (Non-Hispanic) Female 
VARIABLES Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
     
Incumbent 3.504***  3.489***  
 (1.071)  (1.090)  
% Demographic 
Group 
0.659*** 
(0.0491) 
0.659*** 
(0.0493) 
0.259*** 
(0.0589) 
0.258*** 
(0.0592) 
Econ * Incumbent -1.525* 0.0169 -36.24** 0.369 
(0.820) (0.0335) (16.68) (0.645) 
Econ * Incumbent 
* % Demographic 
Group 
0.463*** 
(0.0584) 
-0.000347 
(0.00147) 
0.712** 
(0.332) 
-0.00680 
(0.0127) 
Constant 46.05*** 39.92*** 37.72*** 33.45*** 
(0.729) (0.427) (3.070) (3.001) 
     
Observations 9,072 9,072 9,072 9,072 
R2 0.819 0.817 0.812 0.812 
Number of 
Counties 
3,023 3,023 3,023 3,023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As seen above, Incumbent and % Demographic Group are statistically significant 
variables at the 1% level across all four models. This is similar to the results of Eisenberg 
and Ketcham (2004). Unlike the results of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), the black non-
Hispanic model finds Econ*Incumbent for real per capita personal income growth to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level with a negative coefficient.  
Similarly to Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), Econ*Incumbent*% Demographic 
Group results for the black non-Hispanic real per capita personal income growth model is 
found to have a statistically significant at the 1% level (instead of the 5% level), meaning 
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that counties with higher proportions of black residents will experience a greater change 
in voting behavior due to changes in county-level real per capita personal income growth. 
Unemployment rate change is not found to have a statistically significant effect on voting 
for black non-Hispanics at the county level, which is similar to the results of Eisenberg 
and Ketcham (2004).  
While the results for females cannot be perfectly compared to Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004), they indicate that both Econ*Incumbent and Econ*Incumbent*% 
Demographic Group for real per capita personal income growth to have a statistically 
significant on vote share at the 5% level. Counties with higher proportions of females 
will experience a greater change in their voting behavior because of changes in the 
county-level real per capita income growth. Unemployment rate change is not found to 
have a statistically significant effect on voting for females at the county level. This 
observation is similar to the results for males of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004). 
It is difficult to postulate why exactly the results from this model differ from 
Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004). Most likely, it is due to differences in data. While both 
data sets drew the unemployment numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are 
noteworthy differences in how Eisenberg and Ketcham created their real per capita 
income growth data when compared with my equivalent variable. According to Eisenberg 
and Ketcham, “real income and real disposable income is constructed using personal 
income, personal disposable income, and the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and is measured on a per capita basis using Census population data” 
(Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004; 4). In contrast, my data for growth of real per capita 
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personal income came from per capita personal income data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and was adjusted for inflation using the national GDP deflator from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In addition, Eisenberg and Ketcham run their 
model for real per capita personal income growth for the election years between 1972-
2000, instead of 1992-2000 (although their unemployment rate change regression only 
ran from 1992-2000, due to county-level unemployment rate data being available from 
1990 onwards). The reason I chose to run my model for real per capita personal income 
growth for 1992-2000 was to allow for more accurate comparison between the election 
years of 1992-2000 and 2004-2012. 
 
4.2 2004-2012 ELECTIONS RESULTS 
The first set of results, as seen in Table 4.2-1, replicate the first model but for the 2004-
2012 elections years.  
Table 4.2-1: County Level Economic Voting for the 2004-2012 Elections 
 
VARIABLES Real Per Capita Income Growth (%) Unemployment Rate Change 
   
Incumbent 7.783***  
 (0.991)  
Econ * Incumbent -0.0238 -0.0479 
 (0.818) (0.0660) 
Constant 33.39*** 39.43*** 
 (0.738) (0.0627) 
   
Observations 9,148 9,148 
R2 0.530 0.530 
Number of Counties 3,049 3,049 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As seen above, neither the real per capita personal income growth or 
unemployment rate change over the past year has a statistically significant effect on 
presidential voting. These results are similar to those in Table 4.1-1. Note that the 
Econ*Incumbent coefficients do not share the same signs as the results of Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004) and Table 4.1-1, as they are negative.12 The Incumbent variable is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and positive, just like in Table 4.1-1 and Eisenberg 
and Ketcham (2004). Note that the regression R2 value drops from 81% to 53% for the 
2004-2012 elections, meaning that the same model accounts for less of the variation in 
vote share for these elections. It is unclear why this value drops so much, but, 
presumably, there are some omitted variables that either appeared or became more 
important in the 2004-2012 elections. 
The second set of results, as seen in Table 4.2-2, replicates the model of county 
level economic voting by demographic group for the elections years of 2004-2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Since the variables are not statistically significant, it is a moot point to explain this sign change. 
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Table 4.2-2: County Level Economic Voting by Demographic Group for the 2004-
2012 Elections 
 Black (Non-Hispanic) Female 
VARIABLES Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
     
Incumbent -0.487  -1.335  
 (1.133)  (1.146)  
% Demographic 
Group 
0.527*** 
(0.0506) 
0.501*** 
(0.0505) 
0.151** 
(0.0623) 
0.109* 
(0.0633) 
Econ * Incumbent -1.530* 0.256*** -17.00 2.862*** 
 (0.858) (0.0722) (13.75) (0.854) 
Econ * Incumbent 
* % Demographic 
Group 
0.368*** 
(0.0568) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.00274) 
0.346 
(0.277) 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0169) 
Constant 34.48*** 35.31*** 32.34*** 33.80*** 
 (0.916) (0.451) (3.229) (3.176) 
     
Observations 9,073 9,073 9,073 9,073 
R2 0.540 0.544 0.529 0.530 
Number of 
Counties 
3,024 3,024 3,024 3,024 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that Incumbent is not statistically significant for either demographic group in 
the real per capita personal income growth model. % Demographic group is statistically 
significant for each black non-Hispanic model at the 1% level, just like in Table 4.1-2. 
The same variable carries a statistically significant coefficient in both female models, but 
at lower levels (5% level for real per capita personal income growth and 10% level for 
unemployment rate change). Econ*Incumbent is statistically significant for both black 
non-Hispanic models, unlike in 1992-2000 when the same variable was only statistically 
significant for the real per capita personal income growth model.  Econ*Incumbent is 
only statistically significant for the unemployment rate change model for females, unlike 
| 43 
 
in 1992-2000 when the same variable was only statistically significant for the real per 
capita personal income growth model.   
The above results find Econ*Incumbent*% Demographic Group for the real per 
capita personal income growth model to be statistically significant for black non-
Hispanics at the 1% level, just as in the 1992-2000 elections. Counties with higher 
proportions of black residents will experience a greater change in voting behavior due to 
changes in county-level real per capita personal income growth. Unemployment rate 
change has a statistically significant effect, and a negative coefficient, on voting for black 
non-Hispanics at the county level, which is different to the results of Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004) and my own results for the 1992-2000 elections. Since this data set 
covers two elections when the incumbent was a Republican, it is unclear why this 
coefficient changed sign. As explained by Fair (1978) in the literature review (section 
2.1), it would be understandable if the coefficient changed sign due to the Great 
Recession, but only if there was a Democrat incumbent. 
For the 2004-2012 elections, Econ*Incumbent*% Demographic Group for the 
real per capita personal income growth model is not found to be statistically significant 
for females. This contradicts the results from the 1992-2000 elections, which found the 
same variable to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Econ*Incumbent*% 
Demographic Group for the unemployment rate change model is found to be statistically 
significant for females at the 1% level. This indicates that counties with higher 
proportions of females will experience a greater change in voting behavior due to 
changes in the unemployment rate at the county level. In contrast, for the 1992-2000 
| 44 
 
elections, the same variable was not statistically significant. It is possible that this change 
in voting responsiveness might be due to the Great Recession. As primary caretakers of 
the homes of the majority of the population, (Council of Economic Advisers) females 
would seem likely to have a greater change in their voting behavior in response to their 
spouse becoming unemployed due to the recession.13 This data set covers two elections 
when the incumbent was a Republican, so it is unclear if the after-effects of the Great 
Recession are the only reason why the coefficient changed signs.  
Note that the regression R2 value drops from around 81% in Table 4.1-2 to around 
54% for the 2004-2012 elections (in Table 4.2-2), meaning that the same model accounts 
for less of the change in vote share for these elections. It is unclear why this value drops 
so drastically, but there might be some omitted variables that are not being captured in 
the model that either appeared or became more important in the 2004-2012 elections. 
 
4.3 OKUN’S LAW AT THE COUNTY LEVEL 
As discussed previously, working with county data brings a whole host of problems due 
to the differing economic conditions of each county. These conditions require not only 
the creation of a fixed effects regression model, but also create an opportunity to study 
the effects these outliers have on regression model results. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Even if the female population is older in certain counties, I postulate that the negative effect of a spouse 
becoming unemployed would persist. As I mentioned in my methodology section, only 4% of women 65 or 
over have never been married. It is unlikely that a large percentage of women get married after they’re 40, 
so one can still expect the majority of “older” women (even if we bring down the age to 40) to experience a 
negative effect from a spouse becoming unemployed. 
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 I will use Okun’s law here to act as a check for the robustness of my results. 
Okun’s Law tells us to expect a consistent relationship between growth of real GDP and 
the change in the unemployment rate. Okun’s Law has been strongly supported by 
historical economic data in the US. As seen in Graph 4.3-1, this relationship continued to 
hold at the US national level even during the Great Recession as a decrease in growth of 
real GDP resulted in an increase in the change in unemployment the rate. Given that the 
regression R2 at the national level is typically of the order of 75%, which is quite strong 
given that the LHS variable is in changes and not levels, we would expect the relationship 
to hold for the county level data set. If it does not, then this could be taken as an indicator 
of some sort of data inconsistencies. 
Graph 4.3-1: Okun’s Law as observed during the Great Recession (Daly et. al., 
2014) 
 
As seen in Graph 4.3-2 and Table 4.3-1 (Test 1), this relationship does not hold 
true at the county level across the 1992-2012 election years. This is because there are 
some notable outliers in the data. For example, the data set contains a cluster of counties 
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that experienced negative growth in real per capita personal income of more than 10 
percentage points and a decrease in the unemployment of around 10 percentage points. 
Clearly, these counties were going through hard economic times and their specific county 
characteristics meant that their economic downturn had a dramatic effect on the county’s 
economic indicators. To go back to the example of Arthur County, NE, this county 
experienced an extraordinary decline in growth of real per capita personal income from 
1995 to 1996 of -85 percentage points. While I was unable to discover the source of this 
decline due to lack of information on the county’s happenings in 1996 available online, 
one can hypothesize, for example, that a change in the crop yield of a county with around 
430 people (at the time) would have a great effect on the real per capita personal income 
of those living there. However, there are many other possibilities, including sampling 
errors for the unemployment rate. 
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Table 4.3-1: Output of Regressions Testing Okun’s Law at the County Level for the 
1992-2000 Elections 
  Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
VARIABLES Growth in Per 
Capita Income 
Growth in Per Capita 
Income (Big 
Population Counties) 
Growth in Per 
Capita Income 
(Without Outliers) 
    
Change in Unemployment 
Rate 
0.0662*** 
(0.00316) 
  
   
Change in Unemployment 
Rate (Big Population 
Counties) 
 0.0971*** 
(0.00900) 
 
   
Change in Unemployment 
Rate (Without Outliers) 
  -0.000382 
(0.000252) 
   
Constant 0.0235*** 0.0155 0.0313*** 
 (0.00442) (0.0110) (0.000298) 
    
Observations 9,444 1,612 8,715 
R-squared 0.044 0.067 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Graph 4.3-2: gpci vs. cur at the County Level for the Election Years 1992-2000 
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 Consequently, I change the sample period to see if the county data would support 
Okun’s Law.  
 The first variable I generate is bigcounty and, subsequently, the economic 
variables biggpci and bigcur. The variable bigcounty represents a binary variable that 
equals 1 if the total population of the county is greater than or equal to 100,000 persons 
and 0 otherwise. The variables biggpci and bigcur denote the gpci and cur of counties 
with a population greater than or equal to 100,000 persons. Table 4.3-2 shows the number 
of observations of bigcounty for the election years studied. Population data is gathered 
from the Missouri Census Data Center14. Note that 500 counties are roughly 16% of 
3,050 total counties.  
Table 4.3-2: bigcounty Observations Across Election Years 
Election Year bigcounty Observations 
1992 484 
1996 513 
2000 530 
2004 550 
2008 572 
2012 583 
  
When controlling for bigcounty, as seen in Table 4.3-1 (Test 1), one still finds that 
there is a relationship between is positive, albeit very small, between growth in biggpci 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Since the county-level population estimates were only available until 2011, I replaced the missing 2012 
data with the 2011 data. Of course, this is an imperfect fix, but it should not have a disastrous effect on the 
number of counties that might have otherwise passed the bigcounty population threshold between 2011 and 
2012.  
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and bigcur for the election years from 1992-2000. This is because, as seen in Graph 4.3-
3, there are some outliers in the data set that experienced growth in real per capita of less 
than -10 percentage points.  
Graph 4.3-3: biggpci vs. bigcur for the 1992-2000 Election Years 
 
 These results indicate that Okun’s Law does not hold true for counties with a 
population of greater than or equal to 100,000 because extraordinary outliers affect the 
regression results.  
Because of the above results, I also created two variables that specifically took out 
outliers in both gpci and cur, regardless of population size. The variable adjgpci denotes 
gpci of greater than -10% and smaller than 10%. The variable adjcur denotes cur of 
greater than -5% and smaller than 5%. Graph 4.3-4 and Table 4.3-1 (Test 3) show that, 
when extraordinary outliers are taken out, Okun’s Law fits with county-level data. 
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Graph 4.3-4: adjgpci vs. adjcur for the Election Years 1992-2000 
 
When controlling for specific outliers, regardless of county population size, as 
seen in Table 4.3-1 and Graph 4.3-4, one finds that the relationship between growth in 
adjgpci and adjcur is negative for the elections year between 1992-2000. These results 
are in line with Okun’s Law, and, subsequently, prove that it holds true when one takes 
out extraordinary county outliers.   
Results for how Okun’s Law holds for the election years 2004-2012 and 1992-
2012 can be found in Appendix Figures E-K.  
 
	  
| 51 
 
4.4 1992-2000 ELECTIONS RESULTS WHILE CONTROLLING 
FOR OUTLIERS 
  
Using the adjusted variables that are consistent with Okun’s law, adjgpci and adjcur, I 
run the same model as in the first set of results for the 1992-2000 to see how they 
compare. While the original model does control for entity fixed-effects, taking out 
outliers allows one to truly see if, and to what extent, it controls for all the extraordinary 
outliers that make the unadjusted county level data run contrary to Okun’s Law.  
Table 4.4-1: Adjusted County Level Economic Voting for the 1992-2000 Elections 
 
VARIABLES Real Per Capita Income Growth (%) Unemployment Rate Change 
   
Incumbent 3.369***  
 (0.945)  
Econ*Incumbent -0.139 0.0404 
 (1.474) (0.0337) 
Constant 50.02*** 46.79*** 
 (0.227) (0.0508) 
   
Observations 8,530 9,052 
R2 0.807 0.809 
Number of Counties 3,023 3,048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As seen above in Table 4.4-1, after adjusting for extraordinary outliers, the results 
are very similar to those in Table 4.1-1 for the 1992-2000 elections with respect to both 
which variables are statistically significant are the signs for each coefficient. Most of the 
coefficients are virtually unchanged when compared to those in the previous regressions 
result. Note that adjusting for outliers removes only 25 counties for the real per capita 
personal income growth model, and none for the unemployment rate change model. 
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There are, however, fewer observations in both models, meaning that some counties 
experienced extraordinary growth in per capita personal income or unemployment rate 
change during certain election year(s). Removing outliers has no noticeable effect on the 
regression models’ R2 value, indicating that the model continues to account for around 
81% in the variation in Democratic vote share.   
Table 4.4-2: Adjusted County Level Economic Voting by Demographic Group for 
the 1992-2000 Elections 
 Black (Non-Hispanic) Female 
VARIABLES Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
Real Per 
Capita 
Income 
Growth (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
     
Incumbent 3.505***  3.493***  
 (1.064)  (1.088)  
% Demographic 
Group 
0.708*** 
(0.0508) 
0.663*** 
(0.0494) 
0.280*** 
 (0.0651) 
0.258*** 
 (0.0600) 
Econ * Incumbent -2.676* 0.0324 -87.01*** 0.366 
(0.820) (0.0398) (25.55) (0.763) 
Econ * Incumbent 
* % Demographic 
Group 
0.587*** 
 (0.0720) 
-0.000333 
(0.00180) 
1.717*** 
(0.506) 
-0.00636 
 (0.0151) 
Constant 43.38*** 40.26*** 34.60*** 31.29*** 
(0.475) (0.422) (3.308) (3.032) 
     
Observations 8,458 8,978 8,458 8,978 
R2 0.817 0.815 0.809 0.810 
Number of 
Counties 
2,998 3,023 2,998 3,023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The second set of results in Table 4.4-2 are similar to those in the results from the 
previous model in Table 4.1-2. One noteworthy difference is that the coefficient for 
Econ*Incumbent for the real per capita personal income growth model for females more 
than doubles and becomes statistically significant at the 1% level instead of the 5% level.  
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There is a similar effect on the coefficient for Econ*Incumbent*% Demographic Group. 
When one controls for outliers, counties will higher proportions of female residents will 
have an even greater change in voting behavior as a result of growth in real per capita 
personal income.  The change in number of counties is found to be the same as in the 
adjusted economic-only model. The number of observations, however, does decrease 
when compared to the adjusted economic-only model in Table 4.4-1. This is most likely 
due to a smaller number of observations for the demographic data. Note that taking out 
outliers does not have a noticeable effect on the models’ regression R2 value, indicating 
that the model continues to account for around 81% in the variation in Democratic vote 
share. 
 Taken together, one finds that, unless one is looking at the responsiveness of the 
presidential vote share in counties with higher proportions of females to growth in real 
per capita personal income, removing outliers does not have a noticeable effect on the 
results of the original model.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to study if local economic conditions affect county level 
presidential voting. Building off the work of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), I used an 
entity fixed effects regression model to look at the effects of county level economic 
conditions on Democratic Party county level vote share in the election years of 1992-
2000 and 2004-2012. In my results, I observed that neither growth in real per capita 
personal income nor unemployment rate change over the past has a statistically 
significant effect on county level voting. These findings run contrary to the results of 
Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), which found that unemployment rate change over the 
past year had a statistically significant effect on voting for the election years of 1992-
2000.  
I also adjusted the same model to study economic voting at the county level by 
demographic group. Like Eisenberg and Ketcham, I observed that counties, for both the 
1992-2000 and 2004-2012 elections, with a higher proportion of black (non-Hispanic) 
residents will have a greater responsiveness in voting behavior to changes in the growth 
of real per capita personal income. In the 2004-2012, I also found that counties with 
higher proportions of black (non-Hispanic) residents would display a greater 
responsiveness in voting behavior to county level unemployment rate change. I 
discovered that counties, for both the 1992-2000 elections, with a higher proportion of 
female residents will have a greater responsiveness in voting behavior to changes in the 
growth of real per capita personal income. In the 2004-2012, I found that counties with 
higher proportions of female residents will have a greater responsiveness in voting 
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behavior to changes in the unemployment rate. It is unclear why, unlike Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004), I observed economic voting by demographic group to be affected at a 
statistically significant level by unemployment rate change in the 2004-2012 elections. 
Clearly, there must have been some change in counties for these elections that caused the 
signs and statistical significances to change. But without further research, it is difficult to 
say exactly what caused this changed. 
 Finally, I adjusted my data to remove outliers in county level economic conditions 
that cause the data to give results contrary to Okun’s Law for the election years of 1992-
2000. However, once adjusted, the only change to be an increase in the responsiveness in 
voting behavior to changes in the growth of real per capita personal income for females. 
So, for the most part, the original model controls for the majority of outliers for the 
county level economic conditions. 
 All in all, these results indicate that the local economy does not matter in US 
elections. Nevertheless, the extent to which demographic groups react to changes in 
economic conditions does have a significant effect on voting at the county level. I would 
recommend that further research be done to replicate the results of Eisenberg and 
Ketcham (2004) that compared the economic effects of national, state, and county level 
conditions on county level voting to investigate which level of analysis has the greatest 
impact vis-à-vis the others. Future studies should also consider the voting gaps not just 
between genders, but also within genders according to marital status and age. This area of 
research is especially topical considering the correlation present between gender and age 
distribution.  Additionally, county level economic variables, such as housing prices, 
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would provide an interesting addition for future county level presidential voting research. 
However, as of now, it seems as if, at the county level, it’s “the demography, stupid.” 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A: Summary Statistics for 1992-2000 Elections 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
psv 9147 46.74 12.40 6.88 89.3 
cur 9345 -0.05 1.36 -13.9 12.7 
gpci 9345 0.04 .05 -0.85 0.39 
pctblacknh 9250 8.69 14.44 0 86.6 
pctfemale 9250 50.66 1.84 3.7 57.5 
total 9250 86176 283454 64 9542578 
bigcounty 6756 - - - - 
biggpci 1584 0.03 0.02 -0.1 0.26 
bigcur 1584 -0.04 1.17 -8.7 8.7 
adjgpci 8728 .03 .03 -.10 .10 
adjcur 9249 -0.03 1.17 -4.9 4.9 
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Figure B: Summary Statistics for 2004-2012 Elections 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
psv 9148 39.97 13.93 3.47 93.98 
cur 9325 -0.08 1.04 -4.3 8.3 
gpci 9325 0.03 0.05 -0.48 0.54 
pctblacknh 9230 9.11 14.34 0 85.7 
pctfemale 9230 50.19 2.10 25.1 57.7 
total 9320 96908 312938 40 9885201 
bigcounty 6806 - - - - 
biggpci 1760 0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.27 
bigcur 1760 -.01 1.09 -4.3 6.2 
adjgpci 8695 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.10 
adjcur 9320 -0.09 1.02 -4.3 4.6 
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Figure C: Variable Abbreviation Definitions 
Variable 
Name 
Definition 
psv National two-party vote share for the Democratic Party 
cur Unemployment rate change over the past year 
gpci Growth in real per capita personal income over the past year 
incumbent Incumbent party: 1 if Democrat, -1 if Repbulican 
pctblacknh Black non-Hispanics as a percentage of the total population 
pctfemale Females as a percentage of the total population 
total Total population 
bigcounty County with population greater than or equal to 100,000 persons 
biggpci gpci restricted to counties with population greater than or equal to 
100,00 person 
bigcur cur restricted to counties with population greater than or equal to 
100,00 person 
adjcur cur if <= 5 or >= -5 
adjgpci gpci if <= .10 or >=- -.10 
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Figure D: Output of Regressions Testing Okun’s Law at the County Level for the 
Election Years 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES gpci biggpci adjgpci 
    
cur -0.000183   
 (0.000503)   
bigcur  -0.00592***  
  (0.000528)  
adjcur   -0.000952*** 
   (0.000314) 
Constant 0.0272*** 0.0151*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.000521) (0.000573) (0.000326) 
    
Observations 9,423 1,789 8,788 
R-squared 0.000 0.066 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure E: gpci vs cur for the Election Years 2004-2012 
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Figure F: biggpci vs. bigcur for the Election Years 2004-2012 
 
 
 
Figure G: adjgpci vs. adjcur for the Election Years 2004-2012 
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Figure H: Output of Regressions Testing Okun’s Law at the County Level for the 
Election Years 1992-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES gpci biggpci adjgpci 
    
cur 0.0427***   
 (0.00182)   
bigcur  0.0490***  
  (0.00462)  
adjcur   -0.000519*** 
   (0.000201) 
Constant 0.0264*** 0.0145*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.00225) (0.00532) (0.000224) 
    
Observations 18,867 3,401 17,503 
R-squared 0.028 0.032 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure I: gpci vs. cur for the Election Years 1992-2012 
 
 
 
 
| 63 
 
Figure J: biggpci vs. bigcur for the Election Years 1992-2012 
 
 
Figure K: adjgpci vs. adjcur for the Election Years 1992-2012 
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Figure L: List of Missing Counties/County Equivalents (VA unless otherwise noted) 
Albermarle Alleghany Augusta Bedford Bedford city Bristol city 
Buena Vista 
city 
Campbell Carroll Charlottesville Clifton Forge 
city 
Colonial 
Heights city 
Covington city Danville 
city 
Dinwiddie Emporia city Fairfax Fairfax city 
Falls Church 
city 
Franklin city Frederick Fredericksburg 
city 
Galax city Greensville 
Harrisonburg 
city 
Henry Hopewell 
city 
James City Lexington 
city 
Lynchburg 
city 
Manassas Park 
city 
Manassas 
city 
Martinsville 
city 
Montgomery Norton city Petersburg 
city 
Pittsylvania Poquoson 
city 
Prince 
George 
Prince William Radford city Roanoke 
Rockbridge Rockingham Salem city South Boston 
city 
Southampton Spotsylvania 
Staunton city Washington Waynesboro 
city 
Williamsburg 
city 
Winchester 
city 
Wise 
York Abbeville 
(SC) 
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